DEPARTMENT OF STATE LEVELEN METERS BY MAJAGE ad ud Malher Declarities faresta Took TO LUTE, Makou HELTONICILE ( Research Memorandum RSB-174 . October 31, 1912 PRITITE TOWN TOWN PART PA 62 FOL TENTIONS (b) (1 THROUGH: 3/3 FRON : DR - Roger Hilman

SUBJECT: Indications of Soviet Stalling on the Dismentling of Cuban Kissile Bases

In addition to the ambiguous evidence, produced by surveillance, on the status of the Soviet missile sizes in Cubia there are indications in Moscow, New York and Havena that the Soviets may be seeking to bargain for more favorable terms ' before actually proceeding with the removal of their missiles. Indications so far do not warrant the conclusion that the Soviets are attempting to welch on their commitment altogether -- though such a development can never be wholly ruled out.

This paper summarizes evidence of possible Soviet efforts o steil.

## State of the Agreement

Although Khrushchev's October 28 letter to the President assumed that an agreement had been resched and appeared intended to freeze the US commitment implied by the Preside: : in October 27, subsequent comments by Soviet officials and publicists have been based on the assumption that further negotiations were necessary before the agreement in principle expressed in the exchange of latters could be implemented.

- 2. Also, on October 30, Hoseow Radio broadcast a commentary by Shragin inich caid, "negotiations on practical questions are only beginning."
- 3. Somet propagabilists are using themes which could buttress the Soviet public position in event of a breakform in

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
the talks. On October 30, Frivial tarfied in article which concluded with a warning about the "danger of fresh conplications", while Izvertive ran an item by its New York correspondents accuring the US of evading its responsibilities under the bargain by not terminating the "blockade" permanently.

#### Erer'er Assurances for Cuba

come Koscow may seek broader assurances for Cuba than a varial guarantee that the US will not invade that country. .

- l. Soviet propagands continues to refer to the danger to Cuba posed by the US threat to the Cuban regime, implying -- though not explicitly stating -- that further commitments from the US would be required before the agreement could be executed.
- 2. On the other hand Pravds on October 30 indirectly warned Castro against using sabotage in Latin America as a retaliation; the Pravds article called the Venezuelan incident on Sunday a "monstrous provocation" engineered by those who atill seek justification for further actions against Gubs.

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demands as a precondition for agreement.

- 5. Castro's statement (and apparently direct Cuban demarches to the Soviets) puts the Soviet Union under considerable pressure to improve Cuba's lot in the contemplated agreement. Hoscow would not wish to be in the position of negotiating a bilatoral agreement with the US which Cuba publicly branded as a barrage of her interests.
- 6. In addition, the Seviet Union is already becoming a target for indirect public attacks on the part of Communist China. Moscow has been trying to depict its evident retreat as having forestabled US invasion of Cuba and prevented a possible nuclear ward. But unless the Soviet Union can secure Cuba: acquiesomos, its case in the eyes of the communist bloe and the international openings movement will be shaken.

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#### laspestion Fracedures

The last on which the Soviets are most obviously bargaining as the question of establishing effective surveillance over the Soviet Union's withdrawal of its missiles.

- l.- In conversations, October 25 and 30, Kurnetsov has indicated that there would be no varification of the siturential after dismantling had been completed. On October 25, he indicated this process of dismantling would take one week; the hext day he spoke of two to three weeks. In the meantime he expressed concern that the Cubans would object to US or UN overflights for the purpose of zerial reconnaissance. U Thank encountered Cuban opposition to foreign inspection in his first round of talks in Havana.
- 2. Other potential difficulties in arranging verification procedures are suggested by the Cotober 27 Ahrushchev letter to the President to which Australian referred in his con-

# Turkish Beses ----

The Soviet Union has not renewed the demand contained in the October 27 letter to the President that the US dismentle the missile bases in Turkey in enchange for the Soviet bases in Cuba. However, Soviet diplomats and propagandists have kept the Turkish-base issue alive, and the Soviet Union may raise the question once again in the course of talks.

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2. Soviet propaganda continues to refer to US withquaval of missiles from Turkey as a desirable response to the Suviet injuistive in withdrawing from Cuba, but does not state it as a topic for the present round of negotiations.

## Conclusions

1. Hoseow apparently reels that the immediate threat of further US military action against Cuba has receded and that it now has some fraction to haggle for better terms before carrying out its end of the bargain.

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- 2. From the Soviet point of view it is no doubt now prudent to obtain whatever consecutions are available before the missiles are removed, that to bank on potential and as yet uncertain compensations later.
- obtained a respite, Hoscow may hope to prolong the bargaining and bar US action for a protracted period during which it may somehow hope to fracte the status quo while its missiles remain in Cuba indefinitely.
- 4. We think it more likely, however, that, for the moment at least, (a) Hoseou is simply trying to probe just how much more it can get in raturn for removing the missiles, (b) Hoseow is extremely concerned to obscure the impression of a Soviet backfown and betrayal of Castro, and (c) it wishes the inspection arrangement that is instituted in this case to be so circumspect as not to constitute an undesirable precedent.



